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RECENT CASE NOTES
as is afforded by a provision for liquidated damages. "In the complexities of
modern business, breaches of contract involve more incidental but real damages
than when business was less complicated. In later years business men
have been more desirous of contracting as to damages in order that their
liability may be a known rather than an unknown quantity."1o The modern
industrial machine with its large plant overhead and mass production equip-
ment, geared to a specific demand, is a delicate organism and its workings are
easily upset. The courts apparently now seek to protect it against the dangers
of uncertainty by allowing its managers to hedge their position with contract
provisions. There has been no indication, however, that the courts intend to
allow a contracting party to take advantage of this tendency towards liberality
of construction and permit enforcement of unfair or unreasonable provisions for
liquidated damages.1 1 Such provisions continue to be regarded with disfavor
by the courts.
The other reason advanced for the shift of attitude is that the courts are
encouraging the tendency away from litigatson, which tendency benefits both
the courts in relieving them from crowded calendars, and the parties to the
agreement in relieving them of the expenses and delay necessarily incident to
law suits. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin illustrated the modern tendency
by its statement in Sheffield-King Milling Co. v. Jacobs12 that "The removal
of managers from the business of a large, highly organized concern
during the time necessarily consumed in a trial entails an expense, in excess
of recoverable costs, so great as to prevent in many cases any reimbursement
to a manufacturer. Modern business is so managed as to avoid litigation-
a tendency which should be encouraged in all fair and legitimate ways because
it is conducive to the general welfare."
The instant case indicates that the Indiana courts are following the modern
tendency to construe these provisions liberally. The liquidated damages pro-
visions of the contract under consideration differed from the established rules
of damages used by the courts in that: (1) the damages were not measured
in terms of the price of flour, the subject matter of the contract, but by the
price of wheat, the raw material from which this commodity was made;
(2) the amount of damages was determined by finding the difference between
the price of wheat on the date of the contract and its price on the date of
breach, the usual rule of determining the damages by finding the difference at
the date of breach between the market price at place of delivery and the con-
tract price being waived by the court in favor of the contract provisions.
M. E. W
CONTRACTS--OFFER AND AccEPTANcE-LAPSE OF OFFER.-By the case as
reported, defendant sponsored and conducted a racing stake for horses. Entries
were to be permitted according to rules contained in a printed nomination
blank used for that purpose. Among the entrance requirements necessary was
one providing that entry fees were to be paid by May 1. Plaintiff was the
owner of two horses and wishing to enter them sent in the amount required
10 Quaile v. Kelley Milling Co., supra.
11 Kothe, Trustee, v. R. C. Taylor Trust (1930), 280 U. S. 224.
12 (1920), 170 Wis. 389, 175 N. W 796.
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as the entrance fee. Tender of payment, however, was sent in several days
after May 1. Defendant, therefore, refused to accept the check and returned
it to the plaintiff with the explanation that it came too late. Nevertheless the
plaintiff, over the protest of defendant, raced his horses in the event. His
horses having won, plaintiff now sues for the prize money. In denying
recovery, the court reaffirmed the trial court's conclusion that time was the
essence of the contractual relation.1
The court apparently found a contract between the plaintiff and the de-
fendant, since the court refers to the "contractual relation" between the plaintiff
and the defendant, and again, earlier in the opinion, the court speaks of "the
meaning of the term employed in the contract between the parties in this
action." 2 Accordingly, recovery is denied, because time was held to be of the
essence of the contract and tender of payment was made after the time stipu-
lated. 3 An examination of the case, however, tends to show that no contractual
relation ever existed between the plaintiff and defendant, and that a more
proper basis for denying recovery would have been the lack of plaintiff's
acceptance of any offer by defendant within the time stated in the offer, and
consequently no contract ever existed upon which the plaintiff could have based
his recovery. 4 The nomination blank promulgated by the defendant amounted
to a general offer.5 The defendant, as offeror, was at liberty to prescribe any
rules and regulations it wished before it could be bound by an acceptance of
the offer.6 One of the requirements was that an acceptance of the offer should
be manifested by payment of the entrance fee within the time prescribed in the
offer.7 Cases are numerous which hold that an offer lasts only for the length
of time set in the offer, if time is specified, and, if no time is specified, the offer
will last for a reasonable time. An acceptance, to be of operative effect, must
be timely made. 9 It follows then, in the principal case the offer lapsed at the
expiration of the time stated, and thereafter there could not possibly be a valid
operative acceptance.lO In other words, defendant's offer gave to the offeree
a power to accept and create a new relationship by the offeree's own volitional
act.1 1 By the offer itsdlf, a relationship was established which might be called
the "power" relationship, or the relationship of "legal power in the offeree
1 Baker et al. v. Western Horseman Co. (1935), 197 N. E. 697.
2 Baker et al. v. Western Horseman Co. (1935), 197 N. E. 698.
8 Baker et al. v. Western Horseman Co. (1935), 197 N. E. 698.
4 Williston, Contracts (1926), Sec. 64, Restatement of Contracts, Sec. 40;
Corbin, Offer and Acceptance, and Some of the Resulting Legal Relations
(1917), 26 Yale L. J. 183.
5 13 C. J., Sec. 68.
6 Williston, Contracts (1926), Sec. 53 and cases cited, Corbin, Offer and
Acceptance, and Some of the Resulting Legal Relations (1917), 25 Yale L. J.
183, 13 C. J., Sec. 82.
7 Williston, Contracts (1926), Sec. 73, and cases cited; Restatement of Con-
tracts, Sec. 52.
8 13 C. J., Sec. 83, 111, and cases cited, In re Aurora Gaslight, etc. (1916),
64 Ind. App. 690, 113 N. E. 1012.
9 Kritz v. Moon (1928), 88 Ind. App. 5, 163 N. E. 112.
10 Herndon v. Armstrong 41934), 148 Ore. 602, 38 P (2nd) 44, 13 C. J.,
Sec. 83 and cases cited.
11 Goodwin v. Hidalgo, etc. (1933), 58 S. W (2nd) 1902, citing sections
34, 35, and 37 of Restatement of Contracts; Restatement of Contracts, Sec. 34,
Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Concepts (1913), 23 Yale L. J., 44, Willis,
Introduction to Anglo-American Law (1926), p. 37.
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and legal liability of the offeror,"1 2 who would have had no privilege to
withdraw his offer or promise in case it had been properly accepted. The
offeree then has a power to accept and create a contract, but the power is
limited by the terms of the offer.13 Here the offeree had the power to create
a contractual relationship by accepting in the manner stipulated, by submitting
his entrance fee to the offeror during the time stated in the offer.1 4 The
offeree had no power to create a contract by accepting after the power given
him had elapsed. 15 So in the principal case, it is submitted there was no con-
tract of which time could be called the essence, but rather it was simply the
case of an offer which was not duly accepted, thus imposing no obligation on
the defendant. H. B.
12 Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Concepts (1913), 23 Yale L. J., SI,
Corbin, Offer and Acceptance, and Some of the Resulting Legal Relations
(1917), 6 Yale L. J. 181.
13 Williston, Contracts (1926), Sec. 25, Restatement of Contracts, Secs.
52, 59.
14 Oliver v. Wells (1930), 243 N. Y. Supp. 528, 229 App. Div. 356, Re-
statement of Contracts, Secs. 29, 40, 52.
15 Restatement of Contracts, Sec. 35.
